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UNION EFFECTS ON NONUNIO N WAGES : 
EVIDENCE FROl\!1 PANEL DATA ON IND USTRIES AND CITIES 
DAVID NEUMARK and MICHAEL L 'WACHTER' 
The ~ t uthors test for tln e <1t and crowding e ffects cd uniuns o n Il<>r t-
uni o n wages a t the indust ry a nd c ity le ve ls. u sing panel dat~t utl Il1e 
percent organized a nd nonunion indus try and citv l,·;tgc diflcrcJHi ~ tl .-; 
co n s t r ucted from C urrent Popul a ti o n Surve ys over the pn iud 1 9 7 ~-S :J. 
r\t the i11du s try leve l , increases in th e percent o rg <1niz c d wer·c ~ ts s o c i~ttccl 
1\' ith d e cre a se s in the n on uni o n indu s try wage dil'fc re nti a l, s ugges tin g 
that crowding effects were th e predominant uni on e fTt:CI u n n o ntr:Iiun 
indust ry wage differentials . In contras t , a t the c ity le ve l in c re ases in th e 
p e r cent o rgan ized were assoc iate d with in c reases in the n o nunion c ity 
wag e differe ntial , s ugges ting that thre a t e ffe cts predom in a ted. Th e 
authors also find evi d e n ce of n ega ti ve c ross-o ccupation union effcCLs o n 
nonunion industry wage differenti a ls , supporting th e ir h ypoth es is th ;t t 
the indu s try-l e ve l result s were partl y dri ve n by co rnp le ntetttaritv be-
twe e n union and n o n union la bor. 
T h e two prevailin g mod e ls of the im-pact of unioni zation on the nonunion 
secto r a re the union thre at model and th e 
crowding or spil lover model. The union 
threat m o d e l predicts that an in c re ase in 
union strength, typ ically measured as th e 
p e rcentage of wo rk e rs in the industry that 
ar e unioni zed, will cause nonunion e m-
ploye rs to increase th e wages th ey pay in 
orde r to for estall unionization. The crowd-
ing model focuses instead on the e ffe cts of 
spi ll ove rs from the union se ctor to wages in 
a market- c lea ring nonunion se ctor. 
Whereas th e n on union sector "acts like th e 
uni o n se c to r" in th e threa t mode l, th e non-
union se c tor reacts competitively in th e 
crowding rnodel. Thus, for exa mpl e, a 
higher percentage organized causes th e 
n o nunion supply curve to shift out, reduc-
ing th e wag es o f nonunion workers; that is, 
the hi g h e r co sts asso ciate d with high e r 
wages in the union sector re sult in layoffs of 
some union worke rs , who, p erh a ps because 
of th e ir industry-speci fi c tra ining, join th e 
labor supply for nonunion firm s in th e 
sam e indu stry, puttin g dO\nnv·ard pressure 
on wages in those firm s. Although the 
thre a t mod e l is typi cally viewed as d esc rib-
·David Ne umark is Professo r of Ec o n o mi cs <ll ivl ic hi -
ga n Sta te U nive rsity and a F<tcttln· Resea rch Fe ll ow o f ! 
th e l';BER; iv!i c h ae l Wachter is the William H. J o hn so n ' 
Professor o f Law and Eco n o mi cs a n d Director of th e 1 
In s titute o f Law and Ec n tt o tni cs <It the Unive rsity o f 
Penn sylva ni a . Th ey thank C w; Faucher fot · out.stand-
in g resea rch ass is tan ce, C h a r les Bro wn. vVi lliam , 
Di c ke ns , Chri s topher Han es , H a r rv H olzer, Alan 
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0
a a rel ationship betwee n th e union sec tor 
I o . f ·n an industry and the n on uniOn sec tor o 
~he same industry, it has a lso been appli e d 
to the relationsh ip betwe e n union and non-
union sectors within geograp hical regions, 
most notably c ities. 
Economists h ave long d e bated the re la-
tive importan ce of threa t an d c rowd ing 
effec ts. Fri edman argu ed that "any ris e in 
the wage rate sec ured by unions for certa in 
classes of workers \\.C)llld tend to lowe r the 
waae rates of other workers"' ( 195 1:215-
16). In contrast, frequ ent ly cited su rveys of 
nonunion employe rs have foun d that wages 
in nonunion firms arc strong ly inf1u ence d 
by the de sire to avo id unionization (Rees 
and Shultz 1970; Foulkes 1980; Conant 
1959). The compe tin g views are still re-
fl ec ted in modern labor economics an d 
industrial r e latio ns texts. Reynolds et a !. 
(1991) con cluded that threa t effects pre-
vail, at least for primary sector workers: 
"Not only will the threat effec t be imp or-
tant but there will be littl e spi llover effect in 
primary labor markets, because th e wage 
normally exceeds the level needed to clear 
the ma rket " (p. 549). On th e other ha nd, 
Ehrenberg and Smith concl uded tha t the 
spillover effec t appears to outweigh the 
threat effect ( 1989:566). 
Early regression evidence sugges ts that 
threat effects predominate , leading to a 
positive relationship at th e industry level 
between th e p e rcent organ ize d and non-
union wages . Mo re recent evidence based 
on estimated cross-secti ona l relationships 
between th e percen t organized (and o th e r 
potential proxies for th e stre ngth of the 
union threat) an d nonuni on wages or wage 
differentials tends also to suggest that threat 
effects predomina te. However, a criti cal 
limitation o f th e cross-se c tional evide n ce 
for testing th e re lative importance of threat 
and crowding effec ts is that there m ay be 
unmeasured ch a racteristi cs associated with 
heavily unio ni zed industri es or citi es. 
In this p ap er, we provide the fir st co m-
prehensive test of the r e lative imp orta n ce 
of union threat and crowding effects that 
exploits pan el data to remove the influe n ce 
of unmeasu red characterist ics assoc iated 
with high n o nunion wages, as well as the 
percent organi zed. Th e paper tests for 
threa t and crowd ing effects in three co n-
texts: within industri es, within cities, and 
across occupati ons , within industries. Th e 
cross-occupation a nalysis te sts a third hy-
po th esis that we introduce to help explain 
th e within-industry effec ts of uni ons on 
wages in the non u n ion sector, namely th at 
th ere are some com plcmcn tari t ies between 
union and nonunion labor. 
To control for unmeasured characteris-
ti cs associa ted with both non uni o n in d us-
try or city wage cliffcren tial s and th e per-
cent organized, we use fixed industry and 
fix ed city effects in the r espective analys es . 
T o th e extent that the unmeasured charac-
teristics are fi xed ove r tim e, this procedure 
should remove th e bias. The period we use 
for the study is 1973-89, a par ticularly in -
teresting period for testin g un ion effects 
on the nonuni on secto r because of sh arp 
changes in th e perce nt organize d ove r thi s 
p eriod , especia ll y in the goods-produ cin g 
sector. 
Testing the Strength of 
Union Threat and Crowding 
Effects at the Industry Level 
The Nonunion Industry 
Wage Differential Equation 
Testing for threat effects req uires a vari-
abl e that m easures the magnitude of th e 
uni o n threat. T he m easure of uni o n 
strength adopted in the lite ra ture is th e 
perce nt o rgani zed (%o Re ), with a predic ted 
positive coeffi cient in an equation exp la in-
ing nonunion industry wage differentials 
(w""). Rosen (1969) deve loped the argu-
m en t regarding the percent organized in 
d e ta il. First, the p e rce nt organ ize d is like ly 
to be p ositive ly re lated to th e probability 
that a nonunion firm will become union-
ized. Arguably, this probab ility increases 
with the percent organized , a ltho ugh thi s is 
an empirical question. 1 Second , Marshall's 
1For example, Rosen suggested th at at high valu es 
of th e pe rcent organize d, the probabi lity o f uni o ni za-
tion may fall b ecause the remainin g nonun io n firm s 
are pa rticularly resistan t to uni onizat ion. Nonethc-
I NDUSTRIAL :-\~D LABO R RELATIONS REVI EW 
laws suggest that a higher percent orga-
niz e d may le ad unions to raise wages fur-
th e r above their competiti1·e len:!, because 
th e e lasticity of dem a n d for uni o n labor is 
like ly to be lo we r in absol tt te ~ - ~tlll e wh e n 
th e re arc fewer substitution po~s ibiliti es. 
\Vh e reas th e nonunion sector ··~tcts like 
th e union sector" in th e threat llloclc l, the 
ce rttral ten e t of th e crowdin g m ock! is cl1:1t 
the n o :tuni on secto r reacts co mpct iti n :h·. 
At th e industry level, work e rs· in d ustry-
sp ec ifi c human capital ca tt ses those 1\·ho 
~tr e displace d fr o m t h e uni on se ctor t() shift 
in to th e n o nunion secto r o!' th e same in-
dus try .~ Consequently, the s ta nd ard 1·iew in 
th e lite rature is tha t th e re spon se of w"" to 
an increase in %oRe is the reverse of th at in 
th e th rea t mod e l (fo r exa m[Ji e, Kah 11 1979; 
Free m an and tv1e d off 198 1; Holze r 1982) 3 
T h e re are two exp lan a ti ons for the p re-
sumed negative effec t of th e p e rcent orga-
nize d o n n o nunion wages in th e c rowding 
m odel. Th e predominant view is that an 
in crease in %oRe a cts as a proxy for high e r 
uni o n wages. Again , based on Marshall's 
laws, unions ra ise wage s more when the 
percent organized is h igh , sin ce there is 
less co mpe tition fr o m the nonunio n se c-
Jess , for two reasons it see m s reasunab le tu ex pec t a 
positive relationship b etween the perce nt organi ze d 
and nonunion wage differen tials in o ur data. if the 
thr eat mode l is co rrect. First, "·hi le th e ditTicttl t;- uf 
u ni o nizing may actua ll y increase ~lt \-ery high level s of 
u ni o niza ti on , su ch a pa ttern hard ly seems to c h ar::tc-
teri zc UIJioni z::t tion ra tes in the Un ited Stat es in the 
sam ple pe ri od. Se co n d, mu c h of th e indi vidu;li-l eve l 
evide n ce o n th e u n io n threa t hyp o the sis confirm s, a t 
le as t to a limi ted extent , positi1·e relatio n ships be-
twee n individuals' wages an d th e p erce nt o f th e ir 
ind us try union ized . 
~ Sup p l y shi fts out in the n o nunion secto r as lon g as 
the e lasticity o f la bor d e mand in th e u ni o n sec tor 
outweighs th e vacancy ra te in the union sector. (Se e 
Min ce r J 976 fo r a simil a r a rg um ent in t.h e co nte xt o f 
mi n imum wage effe cts. ) 
:'T he ex ist in g lite rature suggests tl\·o reaso ns why 
uni o nizat ion may not result in outward sup p ly shifts 
in the no nuni o n sec to r. Firs t, under e ffi c ie nt ba r-
gaining, uni o nizati o n r es ul ts o nl y in th e reallocation 
o f re nts (see Brow n and Ash e nfe lt e r 1986: Abowd 
1989 : Bro nars c t al. 1993) . Second , so m e r esea rch e rs 
arg ue th at u nion iza tion mig ht in c rease th e produc-
tivity of union labo r (Allen 198 4: Brown and Medoff 
1978; Cla rk 1980) . 
tor. T h e high wages , in turn , ca us <: 
losse s in the uni o n se ctor, a nd th e 
placed worke rs th e n c rowd into the 
union sector , causing th e nonuni o n · 
to d ec lin e.'' 
An a lternative interpretation consi 
with the standa rd p r edic ti o n is t hat c h~1 
in %o Re re fl ec t move Jn ellh of fir ms t 
tab li shm e n ts from on e sector to the o 
For examp le , if a h e r eto fore n o nuniun 
b eco mes unionize d, the p erc e nt urga r 
ri ses. If th e result is th e esta bli sltm e n 
union wage premium in the 11cwly ur 
ize d fi rm , th e firm respo n ds by cu 
e mploym e nt, hen ce shift ing ou t supr 
th e n o nu n ion sector a nd redu c in g w' 
Our stra tegy follows th e rece nt liter: 
in fir st est imating nonunio n inclu strv 
differe nti a ls an d then stud yi ng th e c 
minants of th ese differenti a ls (Kru cge 
''T h e downward wage pressure from th e sp 
o f worke rs from the union sector to th e non 
secto r is presum e d to o utwe igh an y pos i tivc i 
r es ultin g from a shift in labor d emand from the 
sector to competitor fir m s in th e n onu ni o n se 
5Yet a no ther interpretatio n is th a t v::~ 1 · i a t 
%oRe ste m s fro m labo r d e m an d shi fts in th e 
secto r , th at is, shifts of th e labo r clem <m d 
rather th an movements a lo n g it. In th is c 
in c re ase in th e pe rc en t orga ni zed rell ech ;l!l t: 
shift in la bor demand in th e uni o 11 sector. As \v 
leave th e n on uni o n sec to1- to find j o bs in the 
sector, sup p ly shifts inward in the n o nun io n 
J-esu ltin g in a n in c rease in th e no nun io n wage 
e ntia!. We co n sid ere d thi s in te rpre tation in 
wo rk (Ne um a rk a nd Wachte r 1993), bu t we fu 
th e m o re trad iti o nal inter[Jretatio n h e re. 
In Ne um a rk a nd 'Wachte r ( 1993) 1\T a lso, 
ered extending th e u sual fra m ework by cu nsi 
th e within-in d u s try uni o n wage p rem iu m as a 
ex plan a tory variable, with a predicted positive 
c ie nt in th e threa t m ode l (as in D icke ns I ~186 
pre di c ted n egative effect in th e crowdin g 
(Ka hn a nd ivlorimun e [1979 ] di sc ussed a s illl 
fee t th at can a rise if hig h un io n wages draw 1101 
wo rkers in to un e mploym e nt qu et ies fo r unio 
ra isin g no nuni on wages.) However, im ple 1r 
tes ts with thi s va ri a bl e is p rob lemat ic , as it is J; 
be n ega tive ly co n·cl ate d with th e non u 11ioi 
differe n tia l by cons truc ti o n , so in thi s p ape r 
str ic t atte nti o n to the p erce nt orga niz ed . The 1 
p::tpcr co nside rab ly expands on o ur ea rli er p ~ 
analvzing c ity as well a s industry llllltunioJ 
differe ntial s, a nd by examining nonuni un i1 
wage di ffe re nti a ls with in a nd across o ccupa t 
tes t th e co mplem e nts mod e l. 
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Summ e rs 1987 ; Di c kens a nd Katz 198 7a , 
1987b; Kean e 1993; Helwege 1992) .'' "No n-
u n ion indu stry wage diffe renti a ls" rere rs lO 
waue differe n ces between nonunion work-
e rs"'in differe n t industries that n :main after 
co ntrolling fo r individual-leve l characte ris-
tics (a nd som e tim es finn -le vel c haracte ris-
tics) tkll th eo ry sugges ts oug ht to b e re-
lated to \Vork e rs' margina l prod ucts. ' In 
cr~ss-senion a l stud ies , thi s l\\.< htep ap-
proac h has bee n d efe nded_ by Dickens a nd 
Kau (1~1 8 7a ) as a m t:~m s or avo tdtn g btases 
in both coellicie n t estimates and stand ard 
e rrors ar isin g from aggrega tion (i\ l(>ttlton 
1990; Dicke ti s and Ross 1984). Ccn<tinl y, 
b ecause the icl c ntif)' ing information co mes 
from industry-level shifts in vari a bl es suclt 
as th e p e rcent o rgan ized, there is no <tclcled 
inforrn ation in th e individual-l evel da ta. 
Based on th es e considera tion s, we think 
o ur res ults are most info rmative if we use 
the two-s tage approach, which asks how 
union strength variab les e xplain these non-
union indus try wage differe nti als that oth-
ers h ave documente d. 
We therefore estimate the following in-
dustry-l e vel equation to test the r e la tive 
strength of union threat an d crowding ef-
fects on nonunion industry wage diffe ren-
tials: 
(1) w "" = a + %oRe ~+ fy + E . . 
11 II I II 
Th e rare a set of indus try dummv va ri-
a bles, i1~clud e d to capture fix e d in ~lustry 
charac te risti cs that may b e asso ciate d with 
both n o nunion industry wage differentials 
an d th e ind epe nde nt vari ables. Fixed year 
effects are a lso include d to ca pture an y 
';Earlier resea rc h (Cu llen 1956) al so focused on 
industry-l evel characteri stics, beca use individu al-level 
data w~re unava il a b le. 
An alte rnati ve meth o d of studying threat dlccts is 
to examine dire c tlY th e factor s associated with th e 
r isk o f a nonunio1; finn bein g o rgani zed, a nd th e 
firm 's react ion to thi s ri sk (Free man and Kleiner 
1988). 
7Krucgcr and Summers ( 1988) arg ued th at such 
no nunion industrv wage d ifferentials o r premia p ose 
a chalk nge to purely co mpetit ive m ode ls of wage 
d e termin a tion, ;mel o ffered an a rray o f ev idence sug-
ges tin g that these differentials cannot be expla in ed 
by com pet i tivc m o dels. 
common year effec ts. H Fo r %c)RG to identify 
uni o n threa t or c rowding effects, the omit-
ted c harac teristi cs th a t are cor rel ate d with 
th e perce nt organ ized must be fix e d o ver 
tim e ; rhi s, o f course , is our m a intained 
assumption , although we al so anal yze the 
sen ~ iti\ · i ty uf th e resul ts to the inclusion o f 
som e t im c-\·arv ing industry-spec ifi c co n troi 
vari ~thlc .,. An e q uation paralleling this om: 
is u se d lO ex plo re intra-ci ty n onu ni on wage 
v<triariun, a s we ll as intra-industry effecrs 
across occupat ions. 
Past Research on Union Effects on 
Nonunion Wages at the Industry Level 
Ea rly reg ressi o n eviden ce rep orted by 
Rose n ( 1969) showed a p ositive r e la ti on-
ship a r th e indu stry level betwee n the p e r-
cent orga nized an d wages, an d thus sug-
gested that threa t e ffects predominate. 
Rosen' s data did not distinguish wages of 
uni o n and nonunion workers . Since that 
study, a number of papers have r eporte d 
estimate s o f cross-sectio nal regressions of 
nonuni on wages o n th e percent organized 
in the worker's industry, and other contro l 
variables (see, for e xample, Freeman and 
Medoff 1981; Podgursky 1986; Hirsc h and 
N eufe ld 1987). T h is research tends to find 
evid e nce co nsi s te nt with a positive associ a -
tion betwee n th e p erce nt organi ze d and 
n onun ion wages, although often only for 
cena i n typ es of wo rke rs or firms . For ex-
ample, Podgursky (1986) found a positive 
rel ationship at th e industry level , but on ly 
in large firms, a nd Fre eman and Medoff 
( 198 1) found the rel ationship betwe en the 
percent organi zed among production work-
ers in th e industry and nonunion wages to 
be positive , but o nly weakly s ig nifica nt. Th e 
evid e nc e in Hirsc h an d Ne ufeld ( 1987) 
points more consistently toward th e threa t 
mod e l at the indus try leve l. 9 
' T he fixed year effe cts a lso e limi nate any effects of 
th e choice of the om itted industry in th e reg ression 
from wh ich the nonlmion ind ustry wage diffe renti a ls 
are esr imate d (see footnote I 2) . 
''Krueger a nd Summers ( 1988) a rgued aga inst the 
thr eat mod e l base d o n eviden ce th a t th e n o nuni o n 
industry wage stru ctu re in th e South has a co rrelati o n 
of 0.6 with that in th e rest o f the cou ntry, d es pite th e 
24 IN DUSTRIAL AND L.r\BOR RE LATI Ot'\S REVIE'vV 
Dic ke ns ::mel Katz ( 1987a, 198 7b) pro-
vided a more detail e d an a lvsis of th e union 
thre at model. Thev founcl th a t the si,Tn of 
J J • 1-. 
the %ewe variable in r egre ss io ns for w" " is 
generally positive as alte rn at ive indu ~ rrv 
cha rac teri s ti cs are in c lud ed o r o mitte d . ;t l-
though it is som e time s n t:g;l ti ve (Co r I1l :lnu-
factttring wo rke rs) and oit e n sLlli sticdh· 
in sign ifi cant. HO\\"CVC r, so m e of the ot h t:;. 
correlates of nonunion incltlstr\' w;1trc dif-
, " 
fe re ntial s also appea r to support the thrc ctr 
m ode l, parti cula rl y the p os itive coetli cie ttt 
o n profitability, whi ch supports the hypoth-
e sis that th e high e r the p ote ntial rents. tilt: 
hi g her the wage ( Dicke n s 1986). Dickens 
a nd Katz (1987a ) co ncluded that "ex isting 
s tudi e s generally find th a t industry union 
d e n sity is positively related to the e·a rnirws 
o f ... nonunio n workers" (p. 63). Th~v 
recognized, however, that o th e r the o ri es o.f 
non-market-cl ea rin g wages (fnr exampl e, 
Akerlof 1982; Lindbeck a nd Sn ower 1988) 
a lso pre dict a positive re lationship be twee n 
rents and wages. Also, Dicken s a nd Katz 
note d that it is difficult to sort o ut th e 
inde pendent influen ces of th e large num-
b e r of industry characteristics that th ev 
conside re d , since industry c harac te ri s ti c~ 
are highly corre lated. 
A criti cal limitat io n o f th e cross-section a l 
eviden ce fo r te sting the re lative im portance 
o f threa t and crowdin g effe cts , wh ic h we 
addre ss in this pap e r, is that th e re m av be 
unm easured industry c h a rac teristi cs ;{sso-
c ia te d with h eavil y unioni ze d industries. 
For example , Kru eg e r and Summers ( 1987 ) 
a rgued that th e hi s tori ca l eviden ce S LI"-u 
gests that high-wage industri es were a lread y 
paying high wage s before the adve nt of 
wid e-scale unioniza ti o n in manufacturin o· 
They note d th a t the Big Three auto make;~ 
in the United States were w;we le aders p r ior 0 . 
to becoming unioni ze d. In additi o n , it 
a ppears that unions h ave te nd e d to co n-
centra te their organizing efforts in indu s-
fact that %oRe is considerab ly lower in th e Sou th. 
They d id not, h owever, pro ,;id e a n y evickn ce on 
whether c ro ss-indus try vari;Hion in %oR<: cxpLtin s as 
much o f the cross-industry va r·ia ti o n in nonunion 
wage diffe re nti a ls in the So uth as it docs irtt he re st of 
th e co un try. 
tri es with high produ c t marke t concentra-
tion ratios, that is, in in dustries that h ave a 
greater a bility to pay high wages. In n e ith e r 
of these cases would the pres um e d pos itive 
re lationship betwee n th e percent orga ni ze d 
and nonuniOn wages rdlccr a Clli S;l l effe c t 
of th e percent o rgan izecl. 
The Data 
\Ve es timate n o nunion ind trstn· wa,,.e 
diffe re n tia ls from loa w;we reor· ·-; -;irJ, I1 " "'Sut l·-;:-, l'J lJ L- ~- -"'L ~ 
mate d for each ve ar u sin u th e Duto·o in cr 
• J b (~ u 
ro tat ron gro up annual filc:s of rhe CPS for 
1983- 89 a nd th e May fi le s fo r 1973-8!. 1" 
Regress ions were estim ated se parate ly by 
r ace and sex, e ffe c ti ve ly rn <lkim• a ll vari-
bl 
. ,., 
a es mterac tive with race a nd sex. O th e r 
variables included in th e inclivicl ua l-level 
wage reg re ssio ns we re industrv d urn m v vari-
able s; nine one-digit occup~ tion clt~mmy 
vanables (with a b r id cre betwe e n t h e ] 9 70 u 
ancll980 SOC codes); li near a nd quadratic 
schooling; linea r and qu adra tic potential 
experie nce; dummy va riables for fo ur r e-
gions; the un e mploym e nt ra te in the SMSA 
or (for non-SMSA res id e nts) in the r es t of 
th e state ; dummy var iab le s for three SMSA 
sizes; a nd dummy vari a bles for married 
(spouse prese nt) and overtime (based on 
u sual h o urs worke d ) . All spec ifications 
also include a union status (m embers hip ) 
dummy variable, and a full set of inte rac-
tions of a ll va riable s, includin g the industr'y 
dumm y variables, with th e uni u n statu ·~ 
dummy variab lc .11 T o focus o n co mp et itive 
market e ffec ts o f union wag es, we exc lud e 
government workers from o ur sampl e . lr ~ 
addition , to focus o n workers fo r whotr 
threa t e ffe cts a re more likelv to rnatter W{ 
exclude man agers, professi~mals, and 't lH 
se lf-employed. The coefficients o f th< 
noninterac ted indu stry dumm y variable 
11'Th e indivi dual -leve l re g ress io ns arc co ntm Otl i· 
the li terature , so the results ;ne no t t-eponcd in th i 
pape r. Results a r e a vail a ble fr orn the ;uttho rs o 
rcq uest. 
11 l 98:! is orn itt ecl because n o d aLt \vcrc co l Ieete 
o n union me mbe rship that year. Th e clcfirtitiun c 
union m e mbers hip in th e CPS c han ged s li g lttl v l>\"t 
th e year-s; Hi rsc h a nd Neu feld ( 1987) pnH·ide d.e 1ail 
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es timate the r1 on u:1ion indu stry wage dif-
ferentials. v\'e es tim ated the \\·age differe n-
tials for th e e ntire sa mple bv we ighting (by 
industry and nonunion e mpl oym e nt) the 
coeffi c ien L~ est imated fr om sepa rate regres-
sions by race ~mel ge nder. 1' 
Our lll casurc of the percent orga nize d is 
co iJ Strucr u l fr()In the sam e· CPS data. The 
j 1rs t p;me l of th e <q; pencli~ ub le provides 
S\l ll1Il1 <tn· st~t ri stic s for th e indu stry data set, 
re portin g mean leve ls a nd the 1973-89 
changes fur nOiluni on in cl ust rv wage diffc r-
entiah and th e perce nt orga nized, b y in-
dustry and ove rall. The data confirm the 
we ll-known decline in the p e rcen t orga-
nized , especially in the industrial sector 
(for example, Linn e man, et a l. 1990). The 
table a lso suggests th a t a panel data analysis 
miaht sh ow a re lati onship between the per-
ce1~t o rganized and the nonunion industry 
waae differential quite differe nt from that 
sh~wn by a cross-sectional an a lysis . While 
columns ( l) and (2) indicate th at indus-
tries with high %oRe also h ave high w"", 
column s (3) and (4) indi ca te that. over a ll 
industries , %oRe and w"" moved in oppo-
1"Jn dustry wage eli !Te re nt ia I:; a re esti mat e d re !a live 
to servi ces. This r ~t i se s th e pro blem that e st imates of 
equati o n ( I ) co uld he se nsiti ve to th e o mitte d indus-
trv in the "first-stage" indiviclual-lc'· e l wage regres-
si~ns ft·om which ri\e wage diffe re nti a ls i11 e quati o n 
( 1) are es tima ted. To cir cumvent th i,; potentia ] pro b-
lem we in c lude vc a r dumm v va ri ables in equation 
( 1) .·This re mo ,·e ~ the in ll uen,ce o f th e o mitte d indus-
try, beca us e the common trend acros,; indu stries o w-
in g to the cho ic e of th e o mitte d in du st !"\ is capture d 
in th e yea r e ffe cts. The ,;ame iss ue arises with re spec t 
to city wage cliifcrc nriak 
T o se e h o\v inc luding ye ar effect s so lve s the prob-
le m, SllflpOS C tiLl [ in th e fir,;t -Stagc , Cl"OSS-St' Ctional 
regress ion " 'e include cl u mm v ,·a ri ablcs for each in-
dustry, omi tt ing th e co nstant, a nd e stim;nc their co-
effici e nts fo r e ~1c h n;a r /111, !J._,1, .... !JA., . wh e re !\is the 
num ber of indust r ies. Th e seco nd-stage regress ion is 
then b" = :1.,,'( .c })3 + E
11
• i = I , . .. f...', 1 = I, .... 'f', where 
l', is a set oh·ear dumm1· vari ;thl es . \\ 'e C ll l tra n sfo rm 
the es tim;Hcd tl ulllt ni o n wage differ e ntial s . for e x-
a mpl e dcfinittg th c tn 1· ei:Hi\·e to servi ces (o r relati,·e 
to a n an:ragc tlllllil llion \\'age d iffe re ntia l ac ross a ll 
workers) . as in (/Iii- !J,,) = .\it'( + r,.s + Eil. S in ce b,., 
\·aries on h· IJ,· vctr . the cf'l"ec t <J f subtrac tin g it f ro m 
the cl epc t;clc ;Jt \;t r ia b le is simplv tu c ktttge' the es ti-
ma ted cue!Ti c ic·ttl > u f the \'CJr dttmm,· variables , a nd 
the est im ates of''( ;t re u n afTcctecl . . 
site direc tion s twe r th e sample p e riod , a nd 
some of the industri es with the la rge st de-
clin es in %ewe had th e sh a rp es t in creases 
in w"" . 1''· 
Empirical R esults 
in Tabl e l we n·pt >rt !T suit s fr o m reg res-
sion csti!llates ul t·qu ~t tiuil ( I ) . In a ll cases, 
we report \YLS cstilll~tl. t:.'i that we ight by the 
in verse uf th e \<tri <ut cc ul r.he OLS residu-
al s, with the \' <tri~utce cst iiu <tted se parately 
for each industry, pre- an d p os t-1983. These 
variances m ay differ by indu stry because of 
diffe rent numbers of wo rke rs in each in -
dustry from whi ch w"" is e stimate d. They 
may also diffe r pre- and post-1983 beca us e, 
b egin ning in 1983, we use th e o u tgoi ng 
ro tation group fil es and h e nce h ave more 
wage obse rva tion s. v\'e could weight exp lic-
itly by the cell sizes use d to estimate w"" in 
each industry and year; our approach al-
lows for o th er sources of h eteroscedasticity 
by industry for th ese two p e riods. 14 
Estimation without fixed industry effects , 
in row (1), indicates a s tatistically signifi-
cant posi tive effec t of th e percent o rga-
ni zed on th e nonunion wag e, co n sistent 
with threat effects outweighing crowdin g 
effec ts, and para ll e ling mu ch of the e xist-
ing cross-sectional evidence. When fixed 
industry effec ts are added in row (2) the 
estimat.e d coe ffi c ient of % orzc becomes 
n eo·a tive and is si<rn ifi cant with at-sta tistic 
b ' 0 
exceeding four. Th e negative effe c t of 
%c)RG is the opposite of the e ffect predicted 
by the threat model, but is cons istent with 
th e crowding model. That model sta tes 
th at a d ecre ase in %oRe causes the non-
uni o n industry wage d iffe re ntial, w"", to 
rise . To in terp rc t th e mag nitude of th e 
estimated coeffi c ie nt of % oRe, cons id e r a 
14 pe rc e ntage point d ec lin e in %oRe, which 
is the ave rag e change for o ur sampl e pe-
1"1 n contrast to th e regress io n est ima tes di scussed 
b e low, th e n o tt Ut tion \\"age differentia ls in thi s tab le 
mav be sens iti,·e w tile refe renc e inclu st rv with r e-
sp e,c t to whic h th ese d ifl'c rc nti a ls a rc e s tim.at e cl. 
1·1for a ll spe c ifications, rc:.su lts were vcrv similar 
usin g e ith e r JJ!l \\ei ghtul est im a tes o r est imates 
wei o·h rcd ll\· ce ll s iz es. 
" ' 
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( l ) 
(3) 
( 4) h 
(5) 
(6 ) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9)' 
Manufacturin g 
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Table 1. Industry Nonun ion Wage Regression s Excl udin g 
Managers and Profess io n a ls , 1973-81 and 1983-89. 
(Dep e n dent Var iable: Nonun ion Industry V11ag e Differe nri ~tl )a 
Pa1cnt Outjmt/ c;vp 
Organi:trl \Forker Sh([re 
. :\-~ 
( IJ:') 
-. 17 
(0-l ) 
- .17 
(0-l ) 
-.15! 
( 05) 
- .19 
(.O~J) 
-.15 
(05) 
-.16 
(.05) 
-. 05 
(~0 ) 
- . 14 
( 04 ) 
.1 6 
( ~ ~>) 
- .6lJ 
(. :> l ) 
Adj. R2 
.99 
.98 
.!:l9 
.48 
.63 
.Y9 
Lst i rru/./or/ Sju·ufi mt io 11 
Same as en 
Same as ( ~ ) 
WLS, fi xe d ye ar elleCis, u 11 c-ye~tr 
diffe re n ces , o mit 197:', 
Wl.S, fix e d year effects, fi\'c-y ca r 
dift'erences, Olllit 1973-77 
Same as(~), in strum c· nt for p e rce n t 
o rgan ized wi th u n c-;-car Ltg. om it 
1973 
Same as (2), in s trlllll t: ll t for percent 
o rg a ni zed with NLRB ,·ariahks 
Same as (2) 
Non m a n ufactu r in g -. :? 8 
( 05) 
(l 0)' 
Ind ustria l -.1 7 
(05 ) 
No nindu str ia l - .17 
.99 Sa m e as (5!) 
j (.09) 
- - --·--I 
"S ta nda rd e r ro rs a re re poned in parent he ses. WLS est im a ti o n a ll ows a se parate r esidu :li ,·Mianc c for c :1 ch j 
indust ry, fo r the pe ri od be for e 198'\ and fo r 1 !:l 83 an d after. There a re 144 obse rvatio n s ex cept " 'htTc ut h t' rwise i 
noted. / 
"The standard clcvi<t ti o n uf th e GNP skue , · ari ~tb le is .004 . • 
' A sepa rate pe rce nt organize d va ri a ble is d e fined for eac h su bg ro up of in dustr ies : ~d l ut h e r cul'lfic it·nts a re J 
co n st ra in e d to be the ,;ame for :t i l indu s tri es. 
Source: ,-\uth ors' co mput at io ns base d on Curre nt Po pulation Surv~vs, 1973-89. 
riod. The coefficient o f -0. 17, in th e con -
text of this d eclin e in % uRC, translates into 
a 2.4% in crease in w'"' . 
Th e remainder of th e tabl e reports re-
sults from num e ro us spec ifi cation ana l y~es 
o f th e es tim a ted rel a tionship between the 
perce nt organi zed and nonunion in dustry 
wage differenti a ls, explorin g possible o mit-
ted-variable a nd e nd ogcneity biase s, diffe r-
e n ces across subgroups o f industries , and 
a lte rnative estimation proce dures . First , a s 
a crude m eans o f co ntrolling for ch anges in 
labor produ ctivity that might affe c t n o n-
union wages, in row (3) we ad d a co ntrol fo r I 
labo r productivity in each indu stry. Thi s is 1 
com pute d as th e rati o of th e cu r rent dollar 
va lue o fGDP (d e fl ated by th e GDP im p li cit 
price def1ator) o ri g inatin g in e ac h ind l!Stry 
to fu ll-time eq ui va lent e mploym e nt in the 
industry . 15 Of course , c h a n ges in Ltbor 
productivity sh o uld affect nun union ind us-
try wage diffe re n tia ls o nl v if th e c h ;111ges 
1"ln cl ustry-s p ec ific p rice deilato rs are :1\a il able 
beg inning onl y in 197 7. 
------------------------------~~~ 
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re tleCl \·ar iat ion in factor productivity, 
rather than var ia tion in labor quality th a t is 
captured in the variables included in the 
first-sugc wage regressions from which the 
w <WC differentials are estimated. The es ti-
m :;~ed coeffic ie nt o f the labor productivity 
\·~triable is pos itin:. as we wo uld expect if 
product i\·i LV c h <ll tgcs <tre not e n tire ly driven 
]J\ ch;\11)-!:eS it t the measure d quality or la-
bo r. !-!()weve r . the es tim a te is in sign ifi ca n t, 
and its i n c l us ion does not affect th e esti-
nLtted coefficient uf ·1~Utzl; . 
Secuncl, itl row ( 4 ) we add a var iab le 
measur in g c hanges in th e share of GNP 
contribute d by eac h industry, to attempt to 
contro l for biases induce d by industry-spe-
cific demand shocks. 16 T o captu re indus-
try-specific d e mand sh ocks, this var iab le is 
calc ul ated as the residual fr om a regr ess io n 
estim ated for eac h industry of th e GN P 
share of ou tput produced by th e industry 
on an intercept, the aggregate civili a n un-
employment rate, and a post-1 976 dummy 
variabl e to capture the change in account-
ing me thods used in the GNP d a ta reported 
in the Survey uf Cunent Business. 17 The 
estimated coeflic ient of %oRe declines in 
abso lu te va lue but remains statist ica lly sig-
nifi cant, a nd the estimated coeffic ie nt of 
th e GN P var ia bl e is negative, co ntrary to 
expecta ti o n s. 
Th e es timates in rows (1) - (4) assume 
fi xed indust ry effec ts throughout the sample 
pe ri od . vVhil e there is some evid ence that 
nonuni on indu stry wage different ials a re 
ve ry stab le (Kruege r and Summers 1988), if 
the unobserved industry effects are not 
comp lete ly fixed, this assumption m ay bias 
the results. T hus, rows (S) and (6) re port 
results using differenced d ata with th e dif-
fer e nces compu ted over , a lte rnative ly, a 
short (o n e-year) and lon g (five-year) in te r-
1';Fo r exa mple, if nonurrion wages are more flex-
ible tha n union wages, and hen ce uni on emp loymen t 
is more var iable than nonunion employment, a down-
ward industry demand shock wi ll resul t in a dec rease 
in w"" a nd a decrease in %oRe. In th is case su c h 
shocks b ias th e est im alecl coeffic ient of % oRe up-
lq rcl. 
17T h esc da ta d o uotdistingui sh between wh olesa le 
and 1·etai l tr ade . 
va l. F\ icl ence of similar e ffec ts in the short 
a nd long diffe rence d es tim ates wo uld bol-
ster th e assumptio n of fix ed in dustry ef-
fects. fn ~'<JW (:)), the first-differe n ce es ti-
mate of th e cocfficien t of %or:.c is -.1 9, an d 
is sraristi c:tllv sign ific mt. The re su lt:;; a re 
si111ib r u ~: i1tg ~~ fi\·e -yca r differ e n ce; in row 
(6). t lt c ( 'Sli m~ltt·d codf~cicnt of %oR<; is 
-.1 :). ~t11d is ~ tl su sut istictil v s i g ni r~cant. 
\Jt:q. :t\ 1 h1)t 1gh ]Wrcc nt orga ni zed is used 
as ~lll indcpc nden t Yariabl e throughout the 
lite rature tt·~t in g the threa t and c rowding 
mod e ls , it i~ potentiall y e ndogenous be-
cause . fur <:X<l lltpl c , increase.~ in n o nunion 
wage s m~t y lead to employment decline~ in 
the nonuni o n sec tor , creatin g a posi ~ i ve 
bias in the est im a te of~ in eq u atio n (1 ). 1 ·~ 
In r01\· ( 7), I \'C add r ess this question by 
instrum e nting fo r the p e rce n t o rgan ize d 
with its lagged va lu e . Com pared with th e 
corresponding spec ifica tion in row (2), the 
est i mated co e ffi c i en t is essen t i a II y u n-
changed . Second, we instrument for %c1RG 
with measures of union organi zin g act ivity 
or m a nageme nt o pposition to this activity 
at th e one-digi t industry level, taken from 
National Labor Re lations Board (NLRB) 
Annual Reports. vVe u se two e lec ti ons vari-
a bles, the perce ntage o f NL RG re prese nta-
tion e lc cr.io ns won by union s, a nd the nu m-
ber o r represe ntation e lec ti ons p e r worke r 
in the ind tt st ry, as we ll as r.he numbe r of 
unfai r la bor practice clairns against e m-
ploye rs: the LHter two variab les are sta n -
dardi zed by industry employm ent. T h ese 
variabl es seem like ly to affect the p robab il -
ity of unionization, but at th e same time to 
be "o ne step remove d " fr om simp le em-
ploym e nt <tc~justme nts to wages that may 
make r.h c perce nt o rga ni ze d e nd ogenous. 
Th e res ult s, repo rted in r ow (8) , in dicate a 
stronger negative re lation ship between the 
perce n t organi zed and the nonunion in-
dustry wage d iffe rential, althoug h the esti-
mate is less p rec ise. 
Rcnvs (9) and (l 0) explore the robust-
n ess of the resu lts fo r subgroups of indus-
1"C h cz un 1 :tnd Ca re n ( 199 3) cons idered the 
cnclogencil,. ur th e perce ut orga n ized in rcgrcssio1r s 
for uni on \,·ages. 
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tries, in particular manufacturing versus 
no nm anufacturing , a nd industrial ve rsus 
nonindustrial. 1(1 The specificati o n fro m row 
(2) is augme nted to a llow the coeffic ient of 
%oRG to differ ac r oss th ese industry sub-
groups . As th e re su lts indicate, the esti-
mated coefficients of %oRe a re negative 
and sig nifi cant for a ll subgroups. 20 
O verall , the results repo rted in Table l 
indi cate th a t union threa t effects a re not 
the predominant uni o n effect o n n o nunio n 
wage differenti a ls at the industry leve l. In 
pa rti cu lar , th e results indicate a robust 
negative relationship b e tween ch a nges in 
the percent organi ze d and ch a nges in the 
nonunion indu stry wage differential. These 
results suggest that crowding effects are 
more important than threa t effects. 
An issu e th at is worth addressing is 
whethe r the n egative estimated effec t of 
%oRe in the within-industry regression s 
ac tu a ll y re fl ec ts crowding . As noted a bove, 
the crowding mode l assumes that a n in-
crease in the p e rcent orga nized generate s 
lower nonunion wages because %oRe is a 
proxy for hi g h er unio n wages. However, it 
is th e increase in th e unio n wage pre mium 
that triggers th e crowdin g effect. If %oRe 
an d union wage pre mia a re in fac t nega-
tive ly corre la ted , our results m ay n ot refl ec t 
crowding. However, co nfirming th e view of 
%oRe as a proxy for union wages, we find a 
positive correl at ion of 0.1 3 b e twe e n %oRe 
an d the industry union pre mium , after 
pa1 ti a lling out fixed industry a nd year ef .. 
fec ts. 
It is still possible, h o weve r, that the n ega-
ti ve sign o n the percent organized is due to 
su lll e e ffe ct oth e r th a n th e crowding effec t. 
Alth ongh th e e\· id ence d oes n o t p o int to-
ward threat effects a s the predominant 
1''T he in dustr ial gro up includes con st ru ctio n, min-
ing, dura bl es manufacturi ng, nondurables man u fac-
tu rin g, a nd TCPU . 
"
0 We a lso ex pl o red th e se n sit ivity of the res ul ts bv 
rees timatin g the spec ifi cation in r'ow (2) dro ppi ng 
one Indus try at a u me. The estima ted coefficients o f 
%oRe ranged from - .05 to -. 23, ave ragi n g -. 17, a nd 
th e t-sta tisti cs ranged from 1.2 to 4.9. The rel ative ly 
large range of the coefficient estimates is to be ex-
p ec ted g ive n th e rela tively small number of indus-
tri e s. 
uni o n effect at th e industry level , there ar e 
possi bl e explanation s besides the c rowdin g 
effec t. Below , we deve lop a n a lterna tive 
h ypoth es is based o n comple m e ntarity b e-
twee n union labo r and some nonunion 
labo r . Like th e c rowdi ng hypothesi s, th e 
"comple ments h ypoth e sis " explains th e 
negative coefti cient on %oRe in the indus-
try-level re sults. But it also explains such 
nega tive intra-industry e ffec ts across occu-
pZitio ns , whi ch are difficult to reconcil e 
with th e crowd in g mode L 
U nion Effec ts on Nonunion Wages 
at th e City Level 
Ne xt, we examin e union e ffects on non-
uni o n c ity wage differentials, rather than 
nonunio n in d ustry wage differen tial s. A 
num bcr of papers o n th e threat and crowd-
ing mod e ls, c ited earlier, look at union 
e ffec ts on n on unio n wages within Standard 
Metropo litan Statistical Areas (SMSAs). 
One might expec t labor supply shifts 
from th e uni o n sec tor to the nonunion 
sector to b e more prevalent within cities 
than within industries. 21 Evide nce from th e 
Janu ary 1988 Displaced Workers Survey in 
the CPS (H erz 199 1) suppo rts this pre-
sumpti on . The survey shows that roug hly 
one-half of th e workers displaced between 
1983 and 1988, and reemployed by 1988, 
took a job in a n ew industry (with the 
exception of mining, for which the fi g ure 
was o n e-fo urth ) , while on ly a bout o n e-fifth 
of suc h worke rs took a job in a n ew city or 
co unty. All el se th e same, thi s would lead u s 
to ex pect more evid e n ce of crowding at th e 
city level. 
Bu t all cis,: may not be th e same, sin ce it 
is ;tl su poss ible: th a t threa t effects a rc stron-
gn wit h in citie s than within indu str ies. 
!\tattY u n i()ns. particularly those in th e ser-
vic e-p roduc in g se ctor , h ave pmverful lo cal 
unions that organ ize a t th e city leve l. Suc-
cess in organ izing workers in one of th e 
service-p roduci n g industri es m ay in crease 
th e likeliho od or the threat that o th er ser-
~~ Holze r ( ! 982) m ade thi s a 1·gume n t, 0 11 a priori 
grounds, in focusing on u ni on spill ove r effec ts within 
SMSAs. 
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vice-producing seCLors will become union-
ized in the same local geographical area. 
Also, as shown in the appendix table, col-
umn ( 4), industrial unions declined sharply 
over our sample period, while unions in at 
least some of the service-producing sectors 
held their own. 
Past Research on Union Effects on 
Nonunion Wages at the City Level 
As is the case in the existing literature 
testing the alternative models at the indus-
try level, the existing evidence at the SMSA 
level comes from cross-sectional regressions. 
Some of this evidence tends to support the 
threat model, at least for white male work-
ers. Holzer ( 1982) found that the percent 
organized was positively associated with 
nonunion wages for young white men, but 
negatively associated with nonunion wages 
for young black men. These findings paral-
lel Kahn's ( 1978, 1980) results from regres-
sions between the percent organized among 
all workers in an SMSA and nonunion wages 
in relatively unorganized industries.~2 Simi-
larly, Freeman and Medoff ( 1984) reported 
an overall positive relationship across cit-
ies, in regressions pooling multiple years 
(but not including fixed city effects). Evi-
dence providing little support for threat 
effects at the city level was reported by 
Hirsch and Neufeld (1987). They con-
trolled for the percent organized in the 
industry and the S:'viSA in regressions for 
nonunion wages of individuals. Their re-
sults support the threat effect at the indus-
try level, but indictte that SMSA union 
density has little impact. 
Following the Sdlllc kiud of procedure 
we ust~ d in our industrv-kvci ~m<~lysis , we 
improve on r hL· L''.:isring Sl\ISA-kvcl resc;m~h 
by cstimatitlg th!· rcLtti\·c srn~ngrh of the 
threat and crm\·di r1g effects in a p~tncl clara 
framework that removes biases arising from 
unmeasured, fixed city characteristics. Just 
22 0nc might wonder whether the negatiYe effects 
of the percent organized on the wages of younger, 
Ininority nonunion wurkers rcncct crowding, since 
union workers m;~y be m!lre likely to be substitutes for 
older, skilled "·orkers. The complements hvpothcsis 
discussed bel o w Il!aY lwucr explain thcs<: f'indings. 
as biases may arise at the industrv level 
because unions may target firms in rela-
tively high-wage industries for their orga-
nizing efforts, biases may arise at the city 
level because unions mav target firms in 
high-wage cities. 
The Data 
The data set used for this analysis is 
similar to that used at the industrv level. 
j 
Our procedure for estimating nonunion 
city wage differentials is parallel to the pro-
cedure we used to estimate nonunion in-
dustry wage differentials, using the subset 
of observations on individuals residing in 
SMSAs identified in the CPS ; 44 SivlSAs are 
identified, for some or all of the sample 
years. Nonunion wage differentials arc 
estimated for each SMSA, for each year in 
which the SJ\1SA is identified, resulting in 
an unbalance d panel for the second-stage 
analysis. As before, we exclude govern-
ment workers, managers and professionals, 
and the self-employed, and estimate the 
wage regressions separately by race, sex, 
and year. The specifications also include 
dummy variables for 26 industries, and in-
teractions of each of these with union sta-
tus. Finally, the specifications include 
dummy variables for each city, plus in terac-
tions of these dummy variables with union 
status. The coefficients of the non interacted 
city dummy variables estimate the nonunion 
city wage differentials. For the city-level 
analysis, in contrast to the industry-level 
analysis, the NLRB, GNP sh2re, and pro-
ductivity variables are unavailable. 
The second panel of the :lppendix table 
provides summary statistics lor tlH~ SMS/\. 
data set, n·porting lll C \ll ic\·,, Js <tnd the 
EJ7?.-8CJ changes (for ;1 Stlh.'''l of:):', S\IC::.\s) 
for nonunio11 cirv \\·;1~rc diiicTcnti :lls :ind 
/ ' ~ 
the percent organized. In contrast tu the 
industry-level data, wlwrc %o Re; and '"" " 
moved in opposite directions , in the S ~vlSA­
level data %oRe and w"" move in the sarne 
direction over the sample periocL ~'~ This 
~:lThc sainc qu;Jiif'ication noted in fo o tnote J 3 
applies, bccll!sc the nonunion w;1ge diiTerenti;lis ;uc· 
defined rcl ;uive t.u a p;!lticidar S \ISA (New Yurk). 
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Table 2. City Nonunion Wage Reg ress ions Exclu ding 
Man age rs and Profess io nals , J 973- 8 1 and 1983- 89. 
(Dependent Variable: No nuni o n City \'Vage Diffe ren ti a l) a 
------------------------- ----------------
Regression 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) h 
(1) " 
(5) 
(l:i) 
(7) 
(8) ' 
Ri g ht-to-Work States 
l'euenl 
Orcranized 
'" 
.08 
(.02) 
.10 
(.04) 
. II 
(.04) 
. II 
( 04 ) 
.0 3 
( O'l) 
.0.~ 
(.03) 
.50 
(.2 1) 
.14 
(07) 
No n-Right-to-Work States .09 
(04) 
Stale and 
! .ow I Percent 
0 1ganiwf i\ d). 
')<) 
.90 
.91 
- .00! .0 1 
( 007) 
.42 
.:1 6 
.90 
If Estimalor/SjJecifical ion 
WLS , fixed year e ffec ts 
vVLS , fix ed year a nd c ity effects 
Sam e as ( :2) 
Same as (2) 
WLS , fix e d ye ar effects, o n e -vear 
diffe rences, omit 1973 
WLS, fixe d yea r e ffects, five-vear 
diffe re n ces, omit 1973- 77 
Sam e as (2), i ns tru m e n t fo r p e rcen t 
orga ni ze d wi th on e-yea r la g, om it 
1973 
Sa me as (2) 
"S tandard errors a re repone d in parenth eses. WLS estimati o n a llows a sepa rate residu a l variance for each 
c ity, for the per iod be fo re 1983 , a nd for 1983 a n d after . Then' a re 620 observat ions on th e 44 c iti es identifi ed 
in th e C PS for some o r all of th e yea rs fro m 19 73 to 1989, excep t whe re othe rwise noted. 
hQmits 3 1 o bse rva ti o n s with n o st:ttc a nd loca l gove rnm e nt " 'o rke rs . 
' A se pa rate pe rce nt organ ized ,·a riable is d e fin ed fo r each subg roup of sta tes ; al l o th er coefficie nts a re 
cons trained to be th e sa me for a ll sta tes . Seventeen percent of th e o bservation s are in Siv!SAs primaril y in states 
wi tb right-to-work laws. 
Source: Auth o rs' computation~ based on Current Populati o n S ttrveys, 1973- 89 . 
for es h a dows th e regress ion re sults th at pro-
vid e evidence of union threa t effects pre-
dominati ng at th e city leve l. 
Empirical Results 
Table :Z reports regn~ss ion rt>~ tllt s for 
cq ua tion ( 1) , es timated at th e S:\!SA le ve l. 
Th e panel data eviden ce rt~ gMcl itt g the· ef-
kc t of th e pe rcent orga ni zed i ~ inu)lls is-
te nt with crowd ing effects pre domin ~tting , 
but instead ge n erally suggests that threa t 
e ffec ts predominate. This is shown in row 
(2) where , with c ity effec ts includ ed, th e 
estimated coe ffi c ient of %o Re is p os itive 
a nd signifi ca nt. In contrast w the indu stry-
leve l es timates, the estima te d coeffici e nt is 
not ve ry diffe rent if we omit the fix ed c ity 
e ffec ts, as row ( 1) shows. T h e es tim ate d 
magn itude in row (2) impli e s tha t th e e f-
fect of a lS perce ntage poin t d ec line in th e 
perce tll organ ized (the ove ra ll average in 
th e a ppe ndi x tab le) is to re du ce the n o n-
uni o n c ity wag e differential by 1.5 % . 
\Vc next add th e percentage of state <tn d 
lu c t! ,,·orkers unioni ze d to th e equation , to 
arLtiy;e un ion threat and crO\\·d in g eJ'f'ec ts 
ste ntmin g from publi c-sector union s, rath e r 
th an just privatc-secrOI- uni o n s. Fo r som e 
obse rvatio ns , th e pub lic-sect.or percent or-
gani ;ed cannot be calcu late d, because th e re 
are n o state and loca l wo rke rs in the sample. 
Thu s, row (3) fir st repea ts th e previo us 
specifi cat ion for th e subsamp le f'or wh ich 
thi s perce nt orga nized can be ca lcuLtte d. 
Th e es tima tes a rc virtuall y un ch a nged. Row 
UN i ON EFFECTS ON NONUNION WAGES ~ ~ 
(4) shows tkn the estimate d coeffici e nt of 
th e percent organized am ong pllblic-scc-
tor workers is sma ll and in signiricant, and 
th at the in clus io n of ihi s variable h as no 
impact on th e es tirnatecl coe fficicn t of th e 
private-sector p e rcent organize d. 
In rows (5) an d (6), to assess the sensitiv-
ity of the r esults tu the fix e d-e ffe c ts assump-
tion, we r eport the one-year and fi\·e-yea r 
diffe renced estimates rather than within-
group estimates. In both rows, the est i-
mated coeffi c ie n t o f %oRe is still positive, 
although no longe r s ta tisti ca ll y sig nifi ca nt , 
implying that the inference that threat e f-
fects preclominate at th e c itv level is some-
what fragile. 
Row (7) re purts results instrumenting 
for %oRe with its Iaggecl value. The instal-
mental va ri able s proced ure again res ults in 
a siza ble in crease in th e standard e rror of 
the estimated coefficient or % cJRC. But the 
estima te rem ai n s positive and statistically 
sign ifi can t. 14 
Finally , we consider results disaggregated 
by states (in which cities are loca ted ) that 
did and did not have right-to-work laws.~ 5 
The city-level results to this point generally 
suggest that threat effects predominate. If 
right-to-work laws redu ce th e threat of 
unionization , we might e xpec t to find le ss 
evid ence of threat effects in jurisdictions 
with right-to-work laws. On the other hand, 
th e results co uld go the oth e r wa)' because 
24 \Ve also expkll·,·d 111e sensi1i1·itv uf 1he rt·sult s h )' 
rccs tilll<ilit lg 1hc SJKc ilicatiull i ll r'"'. (2) rlr"pJli 11g 
o n e c i tv :ll a 1 i m e. T ile esl i Jll :t te d c<.>c lfi cien 1 s uf %o Re 
ra n ged f r unl .U~ I l\ ' . 1 ~. ;l !H.l thc t -.q:tl i ~tic~ r ;u l gLd 
fron1 ~-4 tcl :1 .. 'i. 
:!~' ftlfonnaticln ,111 :->LtLl ' right-tu-work Lt\\ .. '-' \\·;t:-; clb-
t:tillcd fro!ll t h e :\:ili<lll :il Ri g·IJI l< J \\.ud: C<Jtlllllilln:. 
On!;· <ll l L' sl:tlc ( \. •lll i,i:t tt:tl c l~:u q;cd i1s Li'-'' d uring 
th e sa n1plc period. TIJ ,·rc is S<llllL· Jllt: il·., id:th k s l ip-
page in idcn li f, ·iJw illd i,icl u:ils in S\IS:\s "· i1il r ig ilt-
to-wo ,·k laws. b,;ctl·~, , .. S<J il1<' nfth c SMS:\s :~s defitlt:,d in 
th e CPS straddle tn<>rt· lh:111 unL' sla\c Tl1i .s is a 
prol.Jlcm for !IH' \\ 'ash i11gt<JJL D.C. S\·IS:\. sin ce Vir-
gi ni a ( but no1 D .C. "r J\ l:u,i:lllci ) h as a righl -Lt.>-work 
law, a nd for the Ka 1'1:' :JS Ci iY S l'vlS.-\ , s ince K<tn sas (b ut 
n o t ?\-li sso uri ) h:t s :1 ri g hl:trl -1\·u rk Ia\\·. E1·e n if we 
Identify wurker·s in st tch S\lSA' bv 1hv sl:lte i11 1\'hi c h 
th ey resid e,'"'~ k11·,. flo illfurnt:ll.i oll <1 11 thv st:llc in 
whi c h 1ilev work. 
th e same perc entage of the work for ce 
uni onized in a right-to-work. state as in a 
non-rig ht-to-\ro rk state may represent a 
highe r proportion of uni onized es ta bli sh-
m e nts in the former , since such es tabli sh-
m ents are rnore likely to h ave nonunion 
workers. The results , reported in row (8) , 
indi cate that threat effects predom in a te in 
both types ofjuri sdictions , and if a nything 
appear to be stronge r in right-to-work states . 
T hus, overall, th e city-level results arc 
consiste nt with threat effects , ra ther th a n 
crowding effects, be ing th e predominant 
union e ffect on nonunion wages . Thi s 
res ult, in conjunction with the indu stry-
leve l c rowding r es ults in Tabl e 1, suggests 
that within a city th e threat e ffec t is stron-
ger, a nd the crowding dlect is weaker, th an 
at th e industry le \·e l, at least insofa r as th e 
threat effec t is captured by the percent 
organized. This patte rn supports the anec-
dota l evidence th a t locally orga nized unions 
in the service-producing sectors create more 
of a threat effect, within a geograp hi ca l 
area , than nation a lly organi ze d indu stri al 
unions create within an industry, at least 
within our sample period (wh e n industrial 
unions were in d ec line). 
Union Effects on Nonunion \Vages 
Wi t hin and Acro ss Occupations 
Our last analys is focuses on union effects 
on nonunion wages across occ upati ons 
within an industry. This an a lys is provi de s 
evidence on an a lte rnative to th e crowding 
explanation of th e negative eile ct of th e 
perce nt organi zed o n nununion indu strY 
w;.tge differential s. This altcrn a ti\'C~ e:-:pb-
natinn is based on the compl e m e JJLarit )' of 
uni on <llld at le:1st ~omc ll<lillllli()n Ltbt'tr. 
Cnmplcmentarit\·bc..~ t\\C Cll \llliun ~tnd n oll -
union bbor G1 1l :~ri ~c if :l Ol lUilion \,·u rk. t:Ts 
are e mployed by firm s ;tci in g as suppli e rs tu 
or di stributors for union firm s, or if n o n-
uni on wo rkers a re employed a longsid e 
uni o n workers in the sam e firm. Th e 
c:omple rnents hyp o thesis do es not requir e 
th e abse nce of a nonunion sector that com-
petes directl y with the uni o n sec tor. but 
only that scal e dTects in the nonunion 
complcn1enrs sector are ~tronge r than e f-
.. _:_:___..... 
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fee ls in the nonunion substitute sector.~li 
If thi s co ndition is mer, th e n an increase 
in th e pe rcent organized-which, as dis-
cussed above, is likel y to be associated with 
a high er union wage-causes a d ec line in 
output, e nta iling a decl in e in d e mand for 
comp le m e ntary nonuni on labor and , 
h e n ce , a decline in the n o nunion wage. 
Changes in the percent organ ized in the 
complements model would thus generate 
the same predictions as in th e crowding 
mod e l. ~ 7 However, as the preceding discus-
sion makes clear, the comple m e nts hypoth-
esis foc u ses on demand shifts caused by 
changes in the percen r organized, in con-
trast to th e focus of th e crowding hypoth-
esis on suppl y shifts . 
The fact that the crowding and comple-
m e nts hypotheses can both exp lain the 
negative effect of %oRe in the industry-
leve l equations makes it impossible to dif-
fer e ntiate them at this leve l. However, the 
alternative hypotheses do h ave different 
predictions for union effects on nonunion 
wages across occupations. If occupations 
are suffi c ientl y different in skill or training 
require me nts, then labor supply crowding 
effec ts cannot occur. Thus, cross-occupa-
tion e ffec ts isolate effects of the percent 
organized on wage differenti a ls of non-
union workers whose wages are unlikely to 
be affected by supply shifts out of the union 
sec tor. A finding of n egative effects of the 
pe rce nt organ ized on nonunion industry 
26 Sca lc effec ts h'Ou ld ha ve to dri ve th e 
complcmciita ri ty , since i t S<T II IS im p la usible: that the 
pani a l elctstic iti es nf substitu ti o n be twee n th ese dif-
fneilt typesof Ltbo r~n c IIeg~Iti ,., . ( l·L!m e rm es h 1993). 
~ 7 ()n th e o ther h :1ncl. the 11"ll>d e l ~ co uld in prin-
c iple Lc di s tiiiguisiicd IJ\ the effec t of th e percent 
o r g~ tlli l.l:d tJil IllHlli iiiu!l ,.,,,pl•>,·m ent, which should 
lw p(l .siti\ t in th<' cr"''di11g "'"d e l. a nd ( m os t lik e ly ) 
n egati\'t: in th e cor11plnn<:IIts model. \\7e are not 
;l\\';tre nfany ev idence tha t ~Iclclresses thi s question at 
the indu st ry leve l. O ne P' o h k m is tha t th e percent 
urgan izcd is e ndogenous " it h res pec t to n o nunion 
e mpl oymen t. The cfTcusufthc perce nt organized on 
nonunion e mployment ha,·c bee n add resse d at the 
SMSA level by Ho lze r ( 1 CJ8~ ) anrl at th e agg rega te 
le ve l b)· Pencave l and Hartsng ( 1984) . ln related 
work, Kahn ( 1980) and Kahn :tnd Mor imune (1979) 
c x:tmin cd th e effec ts of rhc p e rce nt o rga nized on 
h o urs and on unemployment. 
wage d i ffe re nLi als across occupations would 
suggest that com plemcn LHi ry b e tween 
union and non union worke rs may b e an 
important fac tor in the aggrega te industry-
leve l res ults. In contrast , a findin g o f nega-
ti ve effects within occupation s, but not 
across occ up a ti o n s, wou ld suggest that 
crowding effec ts beucr explain the indus-
try-l eve l res ults ofTable l . 
Past Research 
Th ere is lit tic existing evid e n ce o n within-
and across-occupation effe cts of th e per-
cent organized o n nonunion wages. Free-
man (198 1) fo und that white-co llar work-
ers had hi g h e r fringes in organized plants 
than in uno rga ni ze d plants. Mitche ll (1980) 
studi e d time-series eviden ce on c h a nges in 
clerica l p ay in highly unioni ze d cities, and 
concluded that employers did not pass 
union wage gains on to cleri ca l workers. 
Hirsch and Ne ufeld (1987) reported sepa-
rate c ross-sectional estimates (fo r many 
years) o f th e relatio nship be twee n the per-
cent organized in the industry a nd non-
union wages for production worke rs in 
manufacLuring , production worke rs in 
nonmanufac turing, and nonpro duction 
worke rs. The es timated cocfTi c ie n ts of the 
percent organized were positive and gener-
ally significant. But they reporte d no cross-
occupation cCfects, nor pool e d res ults in-
cluding fixed industry effec ts. 
The Data 
T o add a tt o tltcT dimen sion to th e c ru ss-
occup;:Hi o n :u1al vs is, in this section we add 
inform a ti o n o n nonunion indu stry wage 
diffe r e nti a ls <Jnd the perc e nt organ ized 
among tn:ut:tgcrs and professionals, in ad-
dition to hltw-cnllar and orh c r whit c-cc>lbr 
work e r s . ~' T lti s uccupati o n <ll disaggrega-
tion seems like ly to at leasr par ti a ll y satisfy 
the requircmc tlls of cornpl e m e nLar ity be-
~"T h LI percen t u rg;lllizLid is non -n eg li g ibl e am o n g 
managers and professional,;. ,-\ cross in dus tri es, the 
average perCLIIH •ng~m ized for o ur sample is 9 .6 , 
vcrsus I 1. 8% f'tll'<>lhcrw hite-coll :tn,·or ke rsand 3·t.6 % 
for blu e-co ll ar wo rkcr.s. 
li!\ JON EFF ECTS ON N ONlJN I ON WAG ES 
twee n uni o n a nd n o nuni o n labor, and "im-
munity" from suppl y shills. C learly , blu e-
coll a r a nd eith e r m a n age ri a l/ profession al 
or o th e r white-co ll a r workers may b e pro-
du ction complements. Furthermore , work-
ers a re r e latively unlikel y ro rn ove among 
th ese secwrs, espec ia lly be twe e n blue-co l-
lar a n d man age ri al/ profess ion a l occupa-
tions. Unpubli shed ublcs provide d by the 
Bureau of Labor Stati sti cs vield th e follow-
ing figur e s fo r worke rs displaced in 1983 
and r ee mployed in J 988 . Seventy-o n e p e r-
cent of those displaced fro m blue-coll a r 
jobs wer e r ee mployed in blue-collar jobs, 
while 7% we re reemploye d in man age rial / 
professional jobs, and Sl% '' e re reemploye d 
in o th er white-co ll a r j o bs. Fifty-nin e p e r-
cent o f th ose di splace d from m a n age rial / 
profes sionaljobs we re re e mploye d in mana-
gerial / profe ssional jobs , whil e 7% were 
reemploye d in blue-co ll a r j o bs, and 28% 
were ree mpl oyed in oth e r white-collarjobs. 
Fina lly, 68% of those displaced from oth e r 
white-coll a r jobs we re re e mployed in simi-
lar jobs, while 11 % were reemploye d in 
blu e-co lla rj o bs , and 14% we re reemploye d 
in man age rial / profess ional j o bs. (Th e r e-
maining j o bs h e ld by re e mploye d worke rs 
are in service o ccupation s.) 
T h e within-indu stry n o nuni o n diffe re n-
tial s are es timate d fro m the same log wage 
regressions u sed for th e industry-level a naly-
sis. Th e o nl y differe n ce is th a t all vari ables 
are interacte d with dumm y va ri ables fo r 
\vhite-co]Jar \\'Or kcrs, :tnd f"o r ma n agers and 
profession a ls amon g ' ' b ite-collar worke rs 
(who a rc nm,· iJJcltukd ) . Se rvice work e rs 
a rc omitte d from the a n :1 1Ysis. 
Effe cts W ithin a n d Ac nlSS O ccupations 
T able :) reports t~ ~ ti n Litvs o f the e ffec ts o f 
th e p c ru~ nt u : · .~;: ti liJ-.:: d ho th within and 
ac ross ucc u pa ri o ns. "· ' E!fccts o f th e pe rce nt 
o rga ni ze d on w: tg l· dif f t:: rc nti a ls o f non-
uni o n blue-co ll a r \\'o rklT.' arc rep o n ed in 
ruws ( 1 )-(tl ), for m :ma~ns a nd profe ssion-
~ ~1Th c third pan v l " f t he- a p rwn c! ix rep o rt > so me 
descr-i p tiv t' s tat i> ti c.s fnr 1l w ind u s1ry d:J LI di s:tgg re-
g at e d bv occ up a ti<>n. 
a ls in rows (5 )- (8), <t!ld fo r o th e r white-
colla r worke rs in rows (9 ) - ( 1 2) . As befo re, 
we in clud e es tima te s in curpo ra ting fix e d 
industry (and year ) effe cts , and rep o rt \J\TLS 
e stim a tes allowin g fo r indu stry-s p e cific 
hete rosce cla sti c ity th a t ca n va ry p re- and 
post-1 983 . 
Turning fir st to the wttl1Jn-o ccupa ti o n 
e ffe cts , in row ( 1) we includ e onl y the effec t 
of %o Re LI C (percent o f blue-collar worke rs 
in a n industry wh o arc uni o ni ze d ) on the 
wage diffe renti a ls o f n o nuni o n blue-collar 
worke rs. Th e within -o ccup :.1 ti o n e ffe ct o f 
percent orga ni zed is ne gati ve a nd si g niCi-
cant. An in crease o f o n e perce ntage point 
in %oRe BC wo uld res ult i11 a 0 .3% d ec re ase 
in nonunion , blue-co llar wages. ln row (5) 
we in clud e only th e eff ect o f C;i(; U RG \!P (p e r-
cent of man age rs a nd profe ssi o n a ls in a n 
industry wh o are uni o ni ze d ) o n the wage 
diffe re nti a ls o f no nunion manage rs and 
profess ionals. T h e estim a te d within-occu-
pation effect is positive and ma rginally sig-
nifi cant. In row (9) we re port a similar 
spec ifi cation for o th e r white-co ll a r work-
e rs, and in this case th e e ffe ct o f %o Re we is 
positive a nd significant, with the estimate 
implying that a de c re ase o f one percentage 
point in %oRe we would re sult in a 0.21 % 
de creas e in nonuni o n wages o f oth e r white-
coll a r worke rs. Th ese res ults support the 
threat e ffec t in th e ,,·hite-co llar a nd m a n-
age ment and professi o nai nJarket , a nd the 
c rowding e ffect in th e blu e-co ll a r rnarket. :HJ 
It is inte res tin g th :n th e threa t e ffect is 
found in th e white-co llar a n cl m a n :1ge m e nt 
a nd p rofessio n a l market. , wh e re th e p c r-
cen t onranize d is low but 11~~ ~ h e ld re la tive lv 
,) ! 
:\u (Jf cnu r., (~. i 1 i ~ po~si! J ic 1h :u li 1 (~r .. : is :t C<Hn plc-
111<~11\s ,Jk c l .,,·itil in ril,· h itt<: -<:"I LH .' ' < "~" 1•11 . :tl t h<lll g h 
this 1\0ll id i>c d il licult l<> dis l ill :~ ui.s il fr<>!ll Ih <: ,.,.,"·d-
i rlg e iTcc r 
In cs titl l~tt c s " •ith <ltl t f iscd indu str \ ,·Jf c cts . t hco 
CSLim a tc d U\\'11 -UClll fl :lliun t:ffC< .l> <>f I h e pcrCL' lll () r -
ga ni 7.t:< l were p os i r. i ,· e fu r IJu rh blt t<"-cu lhr a nd other 
white -c o llar wo rkers (; tltil<lll gh !lUI fo r n t: tlla gc rial / 
p r o fe ssi o n ;tl " ·or kcTs ) . Th i> pa ra lle ls 1hc cross-stcc -
Li o n al e..- idellc<· r e p o rted in Hi r;;c h :lll d ~C t> fc ld 
( 1987) , in whi c h ther e is a pu :< ili\1.: r e l ~tli n nship be-
tween no nun ion ,,·agt'S anrl the..~ pc r cc nL o rgan ize d in 
t h e in dus tr )" fo r b ot h prorlu c liu n wor k ers ;t J>d 
nonprodrt c tiun ,,.l>rkt· r.s . 
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Table 3 . Across-Occupa ti on, Indust ry Nonunion \Vage Regressions, 1973-SJ and 1983-89. 
(Dependent Variable: Blu e-Co llar , Managerial/Profess ional , 
and Oth e r \Vhite-Collar Nonunion Industry Wage Differe ntial s) a 
Percent Orgrzniud 
---- --
Blue-Collar !1-Janagers/ 
ProJi'ss ionrzls 
Ot ha 
\Vhite-Colla r 
Adj. 
R 2 Estimator/Specification 
A. 
-.31 
(.06) 
-.30 
(.06) 
Results for Blue-Cullar Nonunion lndusl1)' Wage Diffnential 
(1) 
(3) 
(4) 
-. 29 
(.07) 
-.1 8 
(.07) 
-.12 
(. 06) 
-.0 -1 
( 07) 
-. 08 
( 05 ) 
.OJ 
(.07) 
-.03 
( 07) 
-.(Jl 
(.08) 
.96 WLS , fixed year and industry 
effects 
.97 
.51 
.37 
Sam e as (l) 
WLS, fixed yea r effe c ts, one-yea r 
differences, omi t 1973 
WLS , fixed year effects, five-year 
differe nce~ , omit 1973-77 
13. R esu lts for /1'/anagr:r/l'mjessionrd Nonunion Industry Wage Differential 
(5) .16 .94 WLS , fixed yea r and industry 
(.09) effects 
(fi) -.18 .14 .04 .95 Sameas(5) 
(.08) (. I 0) ( 13) 
(7) -.24 . 11 .22 .48 W'LS , fixed yea r effecrs , on e-year 
(.08) (.15) (. 16) differe nce s, omi t 1973 
(8) -.12 .35 -.17 .53 WLS, fixed year effects, five-year 
(.08) (.12) (.12) d iffer e nces, om it J 973-77 
C. Results for Other White-Collar Nonunion Industry• Wage Differential 
(9) 
( 1 0) -.07 . 13 
(.06) ( .1 0) 
( 11) - .10 -.1 6 
(.06) (. I J ) 
(! 2) - 08 .1 9 
(.06) (.1 1) 
.27 .94 WLS , fixed year and industry 
(.09) effects 
.23 
(.10) 
.1 9 
(.1 1) 
.1 J 
(. 11) 
.94 
.59 
.66 
Same as (9) 
WLS, fixed yea r e ffec ts, one-year 
differences, o mit 1973 
WLS, fixed yea r effec ts, five -year 
differences , om it 1973-77 
·'Standard errors ar e rep o rted in pctrenthese,;. There are 144 observations. Sec footnotes to Table J for 
additional deta ils . 
Suuru?: Authors ' co mputation s based on Current Popu lat ion Surve ys, 1973- 89. 
srable , whereas the crowding e ffect is found 
in the blue-collar m ar ket, where the p e r-
cent organized h as d ecreased sharrly. L1rgt~ 
declines in th e percent orga nized ;tmu11g 
bhl c-co lbr workers on~ r the l ~l70s ;111d 
JLJ SOs. ;1\'eragin g, in ou1· d au , 1 .I pnccnt-
;Jgc points per year, may ha\'e implied ~mall 
threa t effects, despi te a relati\'ely high pcr-
cc~ nt organized, compared with manage-
ri al / professional and oth e r white-collar 
workers , for whom the perce nt organized 
wa s essential ly flat in this period (sec the 
thi rd pan e l of th e a ppendix table). Coupled 
with th e results in Tab le 3, the se figur es 
suggest that th rea t effects may d e pend on 
the change in and not just th e leve l of th e 
percent organized. 
The other rows of Table 3 show cross-
occu patio n e ffects. In t h c "pee i f1 ca ti u n for 
the ll011Union in dus try wag<.: different ial 
for eac h occupat ion, th e pe r u :n t organized 
in each ofthe th ree oc cu pations is in c luded. 
In th ese specifications , negative cross-oc-
cupation effects are consistcn t with com pl e-
ments e ffe cts predo min atin g. Rows (2) , 
(6), and (10) reporrwithin-group estimates. 
In the regression for th e bl u e-co llar indus-
try wage differential (row 2), the estimated 
coeffi c ie nt of %oR.G MP is negative <md sig-
nificant. In the regressions for the white-
UNIO~ EFFECTS ON NON U NION \A/AGES 
co llar and man age ment / professional in-
dustry wage differe ntials (rows 6 a nd 10) , 
th e estima ted coe fficients of %oRe 11c arc 
n egative, a lthough significant only in th e 
regressio n for managers and profess ion als. 
Thus, th ese results a ppea r to provide evi-
d e nce of a complementary rel at io nship 
between blue-collar and man age m e n t / pro-
fessional workers . 
The other rows report similar es timates 
using one- and five-year differe nces, in -
stead of within-group estimates. The evi -
d e nce suggesting complcme n ta ri tv between 
blue-collar and managem e nt/profess ion a l 
workers is similar in th ese a lternat ive esti-
mates , although s tatistic a ll y weake r for th e 
five-year differen ces , which may n o r be sur-
prising give n th at fewer obse rvat ions are 
used. 
In our view, th e resu lts for th e c ro ss-
occupation effe cts provid e evide n ce th <H 
n egative union effec ts on nonunion indu s-
try wages a re partly drive n by complemen-
tarity. The reason is that the negative over-
a ll industry-leve l effects appear to com e 
from n egative within- and ac ro ss-occupa-
tion effects. Since the c ross-o ccupation 
effects cannot b e coming from worke rs di s-
placed from th e union sector, and hence 
are not coming a bout vi a supply shifts, J.n 
explanation of th e negative rel atio nship 
b e tween the p ercen t organized a nd non-
union wages other than th e c rowdin g m odel 
may J.lso b e needed. 
Conclusions 
We h ave estimate d th e: relative: s trength 
of union threat and crowding e ffec ts by 
in ves ti gatin g (I) within-indu s try, (2) with in-
SivJSA, and (3) within-indu stry, across-() c-
cttp~l tion efk cts of' chan ges in th e perce nt 
() rg;1ni1.e cl o n clut tges in nonuni o n 11·agcs . 
The exi sting lite raw re on thre at and crm,·cl-
in g effec ts uses cross-sectio nal d a ta that 
iso late these effec ts across indu s tri es or 
SMSAs at a point in tim e. Th ese resu lts 
te nd to support r.hc threa t mod e l, esp e-
cially at th e indu stry level. A maj o r weak-
n ess of these re sults , h oweve r , is tint th ey 
arc subject to bi ases from unmeasured in-
dustry or city charac teri st ics . For ex ampl e, 
indu stries that have high nonunion wage 
diffe r e ntial s may be industr ies with indus-
tn· r e nts th at made th e m rip e for uni o niza-
tion. A key innovation in this p a per is to use 
a pan e l da ta se t of cross-sectiona l observa-
ti ons for th e period 1973 to 1989 . This 
researc h d es ign enabl e s us to tes t for threat 
and c rowd in g effects within industri es a nd 
ctu e s across time. Usi n g a fixed-effects 
estim ato r, we attempt to avoid the omitte d-
vari a ble prob le m inhe rent in the cross-se c-
tion al resul ts. 
Con trary to the r esults of c ross-sec tional 
studi es, our industry-l evel r esults reject the 
con c lusion that threa t effects a re th e pre-
domi:tant union effect o n n onun ion wages. 
Although llnion threa ts m ay have been 
ope rating at the indu st ry leve l, they appear 
to h ave bee n overwh e lmed by other forces. 
vVithin-industry in c reases in t h e p ercent 
organized we re as soc ia ted with de c reases 
in non uni o n industry wage differe ntials. 
Thi s r es ult is co n sis tent with c rowdin g ef-
fe cts predominating. At th e c ity leve l, how-
eve r , o ur r egression results indicate that 
uni o n threat effe cts predominate . The 
contras ting results at the industry and c ity 
levels a rc consistent with anecdotal evide nce 
th at loca ll y o rganize d unions in the service-
produ c ing sec tors crea te more of a threat 
effec t \\ithin a geogra phical a rea th a n na-
tion a ll v orga nized industrial union s cr ea te 
within a n indu stry. Such a pattern seems 
espe c ia ll y plausible within our sample pe-
riucl , during which industri a l uuion s were 
in d ec line. 
Anothe r inno\'atio n of thi s pap e r is its 
cx a itliiLHion of occupational cL1ta \\'ithin 
in dustries. 'We find negJ.ti ve effects of 
ril e percent o rgani zed amon g blue-col lar 
1\ 0 t kc· :-s nn n o nuni on indu s trv 11·ag'> dif-
fer e tlii::ls of'!1lanage rs and proLes~ioiJ:ds, 
:I : I d twg ~ t ti , · c effects of th e pe r cent org~~ ­
ni zcd ~llllOng man age rs and profes sion-
als on nonunion industry wage diffe ren-
tial s of' blue-co llar worke r s. These results 
su gges t th a t the n ega tiv e effect of the 
p ercen t orga nized on nonunion wage s at 
th e itJdu s trv leve l m a \' r eflect not solc lv 
I I - ) 
c r owdi 1t g e ffec ts, but co mpl e m e n tar iti cs 
bct1,· e l"l1 union and nonunion lab o r a s 
well. 
INDU STRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEvV 
APPENDIX 
Descriptive Stati stics' 
Levels J9 73to ]')8 9 Uw nges 
/ndus/1)' I!ata: 
A ll Indust r ies 
Co n st ruction 
fvfinin g 
l'vl anuLlcturing, Du rables 
Nonunio11 
\Vage Differential 
( 1) 
.15 
( 12) 
.18 
(.03) 
.36 
(_06) 
.18 
(_02) 
Manufacturing , Nondurab le s . 13 
(.02) 
TC PU 
FIRE 
Wholesak 
Retail 
Services 
City Data:" 
All Ci ties 
/ndus/1)' Data, by Occupat ion : 
Al l Industr ie s , Blu e -Co lla r 
All Industries, 'vlanagers 
a nd Pro fc ssiOit als 
A ll Jnd u ;,u·ies , \\'hite-Colbr 
.23 
(.03) 
.13 
(.03) 
.16 
(.0 1) 
-.06 
(.0 1) 
-.05 
(.08) 
. 10 
(.12) 
.29 
( 12) 
.1 0 
( .I I ) 
------ ---- -------- ----------
Percent 
Organ ized 
(2) 
.27 
(_ 16) 
.35 
(.07) 
.40 
(. I I ) 
.40 
( .08) 
.32 
(. 06) 
.5 2 
(.07) 
.05 
(.0 1) 
.1 3 
(.04) 
.12 
(.03) 
.1 6 
(.OJ) 
.29 
(.12) 
.35 
(.16) 
.10 
(.08) 
.1 2 
(.11) 
- - - -
No rwni on 
Wage Differential 
(3) 
.0:1 
(_0:)) 
.08 
.18 
.04 
.O'i 
.02 
.07 
.03 
.004 
-04 
( 07) 
.04 
( .04) 
- .02 
(05) 
-.0 1 
( 08) 
-------------- ---- ---
Percent 
0 1gan iur! 
( -/ ) 
-.14 
(.10) 
-.1 8 
-. 3 1 
-. 21 
-.Hi 
-.1 8 
-. 02 
-.10 
-09 
-.01 
- .15 
(0:'>) 
-.1 7 
(.09) 
-.04 
(.07) 
-04 
(.05) 
'S taJHLtrcl deviations are repo rt e d in p:trenthescs. All estima tes in the talJie are tlll\\·eiglned. Data in each 
pan e l :trc described in 1llOJe deta il in the correspond in g table of reg ress ion rtsu l ts. For tlw c it,- d a ta, "·age 
prcmit lJJ lS a re cs till! a ted relative to ;-...;ew York. For the industry-occupatiort da ta. thn· :tre c; tim:tted re lati \'e to 
bl u c-<·nl Ltr. scn·icc s. 
1'T hl' rh:t ll (;i' S :lrt~ dcfill<"d (,-, -lil t: subset of ::n c ities with data for al i \'l'~lrS . 
.\rnll l"l ': :\< I th" r' ' cnm p u t:ll in n =- b:l='ed on C urr c ut l'opul :nin n S u n ·c ,·s , 1 ~17 :~-:::: 1. 
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